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Abstract. Peer-to-peer (P2P) and grid systems allow their users to
exchange information and share resources, with little centralised or hier-
archical control, instead relying on the fairness of the users to make
roughly as much resources available as they use. To enforce this balance,
some kind of currency or barter (called karma) is needed that must be
exchanged for resources thus limiting abuse. We present a completely
decentralised, oﬀ-line karma implementation for P2P and grid systems,
that detects double-spending and other types of fraud under varying ad-
versarial scenarios. The system is based on tracing the spending pattern
of coins, and distributing the normally central role of a bank over a pre-
determined, but random, selection of nodes. The system is designed to
allow nodes to join and leave the system at arbitrary times.
Keywords Decentralised systems, micropayments, free-riding, security,
grid, peer-to-peer.
1 Introduction
Peer-to-peer (aka. P2P) networks like BitTorrent [9], Gnutella [15] and
Freenet [8], and grid systems like XGrid [1] are distributed systems without
centralised control or hierarchical organisation. Given this ﬂat structure,
these systems scale very well when the number of nodes increases. Scalab-
ility is important, given the fact that the Internet is still growing expo-
nentially and more people have permanent Internet connections.
Grid systems capitalise on the observation that computer resources
are usually very badly distributed in both time and space, and that al-
most all of them are wasted most of the time. CPU cycles are maybe
the best example of this. In an ideal grid system, the whole Internet con-
stitutes a huge supercomputer with practically unlimited resources, that
members can use as long as they contribute to it as well. Projects like
seti@home, folding@home and distributed.net have shown that a large
set of common desktop computers can provide a tremendous amount of
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computing power. Even though they receive no direct beneﬁt, users par-
ticipate in such projects because they associate themselves with the goals
of the project. If such large scale computations are for an uncompelling
cause, it is not easy to ﬁnd people willing to donate their CPU time.
Also, many P2P networks suﬀer form the ‘free-riders’ problem where
users only occasionally connect to the network to use the resources oﬀered
by it, but do not donate any resources themselves. Adar and Huberman [3]
performed a traﬃc study on the Gnutella network revealing that 70% of
the users share no ﬁles at all. To counter such problems, ‘currencies’ of
some sort have been proposed to reward users contributing to the system
and that can be used as payment when the resources of the network are
used.
This paper extends our earlier work in this area [12,11]. We refer to
those papers for a more in depth discussion of the state of the art, and only
brieﬂy summarise it here. Several P2P systems use some kind of digital
currency to enforce contribution and optimise resource distribution. All
these systems use a central bank or broker to track each user’s balance
and transactions. Micropayment schemes [20,13,19] seem to be especially
suitable for such a task. However, these schemes are centralised and the
load of the central broker grows linearly with the number of transactions.
It is clear that when scalability is of primary concern, a central bank or
broker constitutes both a bottleneck as well as a single point of failure.
At the moment, the only distributed currency we are aware of that is
fully decentralised is KARMA [23]. In that system, the bank for a user is
distributed over a bank set of r users, that all need to be on-line, and that
are all involved in all transactions between their “owners”. This incurs a
large overhead, especially in cases where the transaction rate is high.
Another interesting approach is PPay [24]. PPay is a lightweight mi-
cropayment scheme for P2P systems. In PPay the issuer of the coin is
responsible for keeping track of it. With every transaction the issuer of
the coin updates a pointer to the new owner, in a secure manner. The
main drawback with PPay is that it uses a central server (called broker)
when the issuer of a coin is oﬀ-line. Therefore, in certain situations PPay
converges to a system with a centralised accounting bank.
1.1 Our Contribution
We present a completely decentralised, oﬀ-line karma implementation
for dynamic P2P and grid systems, that detects double-spending and
other types of fraud under varying adversarial scenarios. Previous work
of us [12,11] focused on the static case. The system is based on the tracing
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of the spending pattern of coins, and distributing the normally central role
of a bank over a predetermined, but random, selection of nodes. Trans-
actions between users do not require the cooperation of this distributed
bank — this is more eﬃcient, but as a result double spending cannot
be prevented. Instead, karma coins need to be occasionally reminted to
detect fraud. The system is designed to allow nodes to join and leave the
system at arbitrary times.
We focus on the payment for CPU cycles as an application of our
techniques, and show how a special minting technique allows us to ini-
tialise the system and provide its users with coins in a quite autonomous
fashion. Coins correspond to CPU cycles, and the bag of coins owned by
a user corresponds, in a sense, to a battery charged with CPU cycles. The
battery is initially empty, and can be charged by minting coins. Minting
takes quite a few CPU cycles. Alternatively, a coin can be obtained by
performing roughly the same amount of work, but for another user. Ex-
tensions of our protocols to trade coins for other resources are certainly
possible, and only involves initialising the system with a set of coins in a
diﬀerent manner.
We design our system on top of an arbitrary overlay network which
provides certain services as described in Section 2.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses
the model and notation used throughout the paper. We describe the sys-
tem objectives and the capabilities of the adversary in Section 3. Then we
present our karma implementation in Section 4, ﬁrst for a static network
and then the dynamic case. Finally, Section 5 discusses methods for early
double-spending detection, and Section 6 presents our conclusions and
directions for further research.
2 System Model
In the context of this paper we want to stay abstracted from the un-
derlying overlay network. We are going to model common characteristics
that apply to routing overlays like CAN [18], Chord [22], Pastry [21] and
Tapestry [25] as in [5], were the reader can ﬁnd also a nice and brief
description of each system. In this abstract model, every node that joins
the system is assigned a uniform random identiﬁer u from the identiﬁer
space Π. We assume that the overlay network provides primitives for both
user look-up and message routing. Furthermore, for each possible identi-
ﬁer u (whether u is part of the network or not) the overlay network can
eﬃciently and reliably compute the neighbour set ℵr(u), which consist
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of all on-line nodes close to u. The deﬁnition of close varies in each of
the above mentioned systems, although it is always well-deﬁned. We also
assume that communication within this set is eﬃcient, because nodes
keep updated routing information of their neighbours. Given that the
node identiﬁers are distributed randomly, any neighbour set represents a
random sample of all participating nodes [5].
Oﬀ-line Karma requires every user to have his own public key pair
(PK,SK) and a certiﬁcate that binds the public key with a node identi-
ﬁer. This may be provided by a trusted Certiﬁcation Authority (aka. CA).
We want to remark that the CA is only needed when a new user joins the
system. After that communication with the CA is no longer needed.
Routing information in the overlay network is kept updated, in prac-
tise, by node join and node leave messages and periodic queries and ﬁngers
to detect when a node suddenly disconnects. This mechanism introduces
propagation and update delays. This is, in fact, a discrete approximation
of an ideal situation where any modiﬁcation in the network topology is in-
stantaneously detected by the overlay network. We assume such an ideal
situation, and leave responsibility for emulating this ideal functionality
in an eﬃcient fashion to the overlay network. We also assume that node
joins and leaves are atomic operations.
We also assume that the overlay network is capable of safely distrib-
uting a blacklist of banned users. Whenever a user detects fraud and has
a proof of that, he can submit it to the overlay network which makes this
information available to every user. How to implement the distribution of
blacklist securely is beyond the scope of this paper.
2.1 Notation
We write {m}u for u’s signature on message m, Cu for u’s certiﬁcate, and
validSig(m,u,Cu) for the function that checks u’s certiﬁcate Cu, and if
valid uses the key in Cu to verify a signed message m.
We also use a multisignature scheme. A multisignature scheme [17,16]
is a signature scheme where a set R of users sign a message. A multisig-
nature {m}R for a message m has the same properties as if each user in R
concatenates his own traditional public key signature to m, the only dif-
ference is that a multisignature is more eﬃcient in size and in veriﬁcation
time (comparable to a single signer Schnorr’s signature scheme). Unlike a
threshold signature scheme however, it does not provide anonymity. We
deﬁne CR = {Ci : i ∈ R} and validSig(m,R,CR) is the function that
checks the certiﬁcates and veriﬁes the multisignature.
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Security of our system is parameterised by a security parameter s. All
cryptographic primitives we use satisfy the requirement that the advant-
age of the adversary breaking them is less than 2−s. We show that the
advantage breaking our karma system is at most that large too.
For describing protocols we adopt the notation a → b : m → m′
denote that Alice sends a message m to Bob which he receives as m′.
Also a : f means Alice computes f . If f is a predicate, Alice veriﬁes
f ≡ true and aborts if not.
3 System Objectives and Threat Model
3.1 Threat Model
We consider a set of n users U of which at most t are under control
of the adversary. In the context of P2P networks, there is an important
diﬀerence in the diﬃculty for an adversary between adding new corrupted
users to the system and getting control over chosen users. Therefore, we
also deﬁne 0 ≤ c ≤ t to be the number of corrupt users chosen by the
adversary after they joined the overlay network. Then, when c = t we give
the adversary full control over which nodes in the overlay get corrupted,
while for c = 0 the adversary is only able to get a randomly chosen set of
corrupted users of size t.
Furthermore, we assume that the adversary cannot make excessively
many nodes join and leave the system, or let some nodes join and leave
in a very high frequency (in attempts to mount sybil attacks, to use them
as strawmen, or to overcome the random assignment of node identiﬁers).
In fact, we do not allow the adversary any control over when nodes join
the system. In practise, this could be achieved by requiring nodes to pay
each time they register, or making node joins a time-intensive procedure
(e.g., by requiring them to compute a moderately hard, memory bounded
function [2,10]).
3.2 System Objectives
We note that for any system oﬀering oﬀ-line currency, double-spending
prevention is generally speaking not possible, unless extra assumptions
(e.g., special tamper proof hardware) are made. As we are designing an
oﬀ-line system, we only require double spending detection. We do not con-
sider issues like fair exchange or coin stripping. We focus on the payment
itself and not on the exchange of coins for goods.
Then, the requirements on a usable, oﬀ-line and decentralised, karma
system for P2P and grid applications are the following.
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Scalability Transaction cost should be independent of the size of the
network.
No centralised control The system should not rely on one or several
central, special, nodes (e.g., banks or brokers) and should not require
any predetermined hierarchy. We do allow a centralised registration
procedure.
Load Balance The overhead of the protocol is, on average, evenly dis-
tributed over the peers.
Availability Transactions among users can be processed uninterrupted
even when users join or leave the system.
Double-spending detection The system must detect double-spending,
and for every double spent coin, a fraudulent user should be blacklis-
ted.
4 The Oﬀ-Line Karma Protocol
4.1 Informal Description
To implement the CPU cycles battery metaphor presented in the intro-
duction, a user can mint coins by ﬁnding collisions on a hash function (a
la hashcash [4]). This rather expensive minting process is preferred over
giving an initial amount of free coins to new users, as in that case the
system becomes vulnerable to users changing their identities after spend-
ing those coins. A minted coin contains the name of the minting user as
well as a sequence number (limiting the number of coins a single user can
mint). User identity and sequence number together constitute the unique
coin identity. Coins also contain a time stamp recording the time they
were minted.
The coins are transferable [6]. A user can pay for resources by trans-
ferring a coin to another user. The sender signs the coin, and the receiver
veriﬁes this signature and stores the coin (with signature) for further use.
With every transfer, a coin is extended with another signature. Thus, the
sequence of signatures on a coin record the payment history of that coin.
Double-spending is detected by comparing the history of two coins with
the same coin identity, and the culprit (or his accomplice) will be found
at the node where both histories fork. This check is performed whenever a
coin is reminted. Fraudulent nodes are blacklisted, together with a proof
of their misbehaviour (namely two signatures of the fraudulent node over
the same coin). This prevents unfair blacklisting.
Every once in a while (but at least before the coin expires), coins
must be reminted. Reminting is used to detect double-spending, and at
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the same time to reduce the size of the coin by removing its history. In
classical systems, reminting is done by a central bank. Here the function
of the bank is distributed over a set of users on the network called the
reminters for the coin. The set of reminters is constructed in such a way
that
– at least one of the reminters is a non-corrupted node, and
– all honest reminters possess the history of previously reminted coins
with the same identity.
We ﬁrst describe the static case where we assume to have a set of n
users which are always on-line and later, in Section 4.3 we describe the
modiﬁcations needed for handling dynamic networks, where users join
and leave at arbitrary times.
4.2 Oﬀ-Line Karma for Static Networks
Minting Let h1 : A → C and h2 : B → C be hash functions, and suppose
every user is allowed to mint 2q karma coins. A user u has to spend some
CPU time ﬁnding a collision y satisfying: h1(x) = h2(y) and x = y, with
x = u||sn︸ ︷︷ ︸
coinId
||ts
where sn is the serial number |sn| ≤ q and ts is a time stamp. This is
an expensive but feasible operation, for suitable functions h1 and h2. In
analogy with the monetary system, imagine that the cost of the metal
needed for minting a coin is greater than its nominal value. We deﬁne the
new karma coin as
k0 = 〈x, y〉
Spending To spend a coin, a user u transfers ownership of it to the mer-
chant m, by putting a signature over the coin together with the merchant
identity m and a random challenge z it receives from the merchant. The
random challenge is included to avoid uncertainty about who is the traitor
in the case where a user spends the same coin twice at the same user.
Otherwise, a fair user might look like the double-spender (unless he keeps
a history of received coins forever). Concretely, suppose that the user s
owns the coin ki and wants to spend it at the user m. Then, the last one
sends a random challenge z to the ﬁrst one who computes:
ki+1 = {ki, z,m,Cu}u
and sends it to m.
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Reminting To prevent the coins to grow unreasonably large and to bound
the amount of history that needs to be kept, coins must be reminted
regularly, at least within the time to live T . This bank functionality is
performed by a random but predeﬁned set of users Rk. The selection of
this set must be done in such a way that
– each user is responsible for reminting roughly the same amount of
coins (load balance) and
– at least one honest user is a member of the remint set.
Whenever a user u has to remint a coin k, he sends it to each user in
the remint set Rk = ℵr(h(id(k))). Here the hash function is used as a
consistent mapping from the coin identiﬁer space to Π. Each user in Rk
must verify the authenticity of k and store it in his local history database.
If the veriﬁcation succeeds, the reminters will create a multisignature
knew = {XY(k), ts, Rk, CRk , u}Rk
for the new coin with the same coin identiﬁer and owner, but with a new
time stamp (XY() extracts the collision out of k). If the veriﬁcation fails,
either because the coin is invalid or because a coin with the same identiﬁer
and time stamp was already reminted, the reminters will audit the coin
and trace back the cheater in the signature chain.
Protocol Description.
Minting For a user u:
Initially: Ku := ∅; snu := 0
snu := snu + 1
ts := now()
x := u||snu||ts
Find y satisfying: h1(x) = h2(y)
k := 〈x, y〉
Ku := Ku ∪ {k}
Spending User u spends a coin at
merchant m:
m : pick nonce z
m → u : z
u : select k ∈ Ku
u → m : {k, z,m,Cu}u → k
′
m : check(m, k′, z)
u : Ku := Ku\{k}
m : Km := Km ∪ {k}
where now() returns the current time and Ku is the bag of coins of user u
Reminting User u remints a coin k = {k˜, z, u, Cs}s:
u : R = ℵr(h(id(k)))
u → ri : k, now(), R → k
′, t′, R′ ∀i : ri ∈ R
ri : t
′ ≈ now()
. R′ = ℵr(h(id(k
′)))
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. check(u, k′,⊥)
. verifyHistory(k′)
. knew = {XY(k
′), t′, R′, C ′R, u}
R ↔ u : {knew}R → kR (this is a three-round protocol)
u : checkBase(u, kR)
check(u, k, z) :
if isBase(k) then checkBase(u, k)
else {k′, z′, u′, Cs}s := k
. return (z′ = z ∨ z = ⊥) ∧ u′ = u
. ∧ validSig(k, s, Cs)∧ check(s, k
′,⊥)
checkBase(u, k):
if isReminted(k) then
. {k′, newts,R′, CR, u
′}R := k
. return u′ = u ∧ R′ = R = ℵr(h(id(k
′)))
. ∧newts ∈ [now()− T, now()]
. ∧ validSig(k,R,CR)
else
. 〈x, y〉 := k
. u′||sn||ts := x
. return h1(x) = h2(y) ∧ u
′ = u
. ∧ ts ∈ [now()− T, now()]
audit(k, k′):
{. . . {k0, z1, u1, C0}u0 . . . , zm, um, Cm−1}um−1 := k
{. . . {k′0, z
′
1, u
′
1, C
′
0}u′0 . . . , z
′
m′ , u
′
m′ , C
′
m′−1}um′−1 := k
′
for(i = 1 to min(m,m′)) do
. if(zi = z
′
i ∨ ui = u
′
i) then return ui−1
verifyHistory(k):
Hcoin := {k′ ∈ H| id(k) = id(k′) ∧ ts(k) = ts(k′)}
foreach k′ ∈ Hcoin do
. B := B ∪ {audit(k, k′)}
H := H ∪ {k}
return Hcoin= Ø
where B is the set containing all the blacklisted users and H is the set of
all reminted coins.
Security Analysis. We will show that our protocol is secure by showing
that for every double-spent coin, a corrupted node is blacklisted.
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Lemma 1. Let r be the size of the remint set R. If r > γs+ c, for some
constant γ, then the probability that R contains no honest nodes is less
than 2−s.
Proof. Since c nodes can be corrupted by the adversary at will, r > c.
So we need to see how large the probability is that the remaining r − c
nodes happen to be taken form from the remaining t− c corrupted nodes
when constructing the set R. We deﬁne a random variable X equal to
the number of honest nodes in R, given that c nodes in R are already
corrupted. We want
P (X = 0) < 2−s (1)
were s is our security parameter. As t < n we have
P (X = 0) =
(
t−c
r−c
)
(
n−c
r−c
) <
(
t− c
n− c
)r−c
and we want (
t− c
n− c
)r−c
< 2−s
{ t−cn−c < 1}
r − c ≥ log t−c
n−c
2−s
r ≥ −s
(
log t−c
n−c
2
)
+ c .
This completes the proof. unionsq
Lemma 2. Given a coin k, t = ts(k), there is no relevant information
in k after t + T .
Proof. The proof is split in two cases.
– If k is never double-spent in the period [t,t+T] then there is no relevant
information at all.
– If k is double-spent ﬁrst at time t′ with t < t′ < t + T then:
• If k is reminted before t’ then the new coin kˆ with ts(kˆ) > t
contains the proof of double-spending and therefore there is no
relevant information in k.
• If k was not reminted before t′ then both double-spent coins k1 and
k2 must be reminted at least once before t + T (they would expire
otherwise). Then any double-spending attested by k is detected
before t + T . unionsq
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Theorem 1. Whenever a coin is double-spent, that coin expires or one
corrupted node is identiﬁed.
Proof. Whenever a coin is double-spent, both coins have the same iden-
tiﬁer and time stamp. It is not possible for an adversary to change any of
them: in case of a just minted coin they are protected by being part of the
collision of the hash functions; and in the case of a re-minted coin it is not
possible for an adversary to forge the multisignature, given that Lemma 1
ensures that there is always a fair user in every remint set. Then, coins
with the same identiﬁer must be sent to the same remint set before their
expiration time, otherwise they expire and the condition of the theorem
holds. Therefore, at least one fair user u˙ must receive both coins before
its expiration time. Let ki1 and ki2 be the ﬁrst remint request of each ver-
sion of the double-spent coin ki, received by u˙ after the double-spending.
Then, u˙ detects fraud and calls audit(ki1 , ki2). audit ﬁrst checks whether
the signatures are valid. It is clear that a user endorsing a coin with an
invalid signature or that is improperly minted is faulty (he should have
checked it). If that is not the case, then the coin is fairly minted and
id(ki1) = id(ki2), at least the ﬁrst user endorsing the coin is the same in
ki1 and ki2 . Therefore, and given the fact that both coins are diﬀerent,
there must be one user in the signature chain that transferred the coin
to two diﬀerent users (or to the same user twice). In this case the userIds
inside of the signature are diﬀerent (or the nonces are diﬀerent), which
constitutes a proof of double-spending. unionsq
4.3 Handling Dynamic Networks
In a static network, the remint set Rk for a coin k never changes. That
makes easy to verify that a given coin was fairly reminted at some point
in the past, as verifying a remint set is as trivial as checking Rk =
ℵr(h(id(k))).
In a dynamic network, it is not possible to be so restrictive while
deﬁning a valid remint set. Otherwise every time a user uo ∈ Rk is oﬀ-
line, the coin k cannot be reminted, and therefore may expire. On the
other hand, the selection of the users in R should somehow be predeﬁned
in order to limit the inﬂuence of the adversary, and at least allow the
validity of the remint set to be reliably determined at a later time (unless
we require r > t, which trivially implies that at least one fair node is in
the remint set).
As a solution we deﬁne a valid remint set for a coin k, as the closest r
users to h(id(k)) in the identiﬁer space, that are on-line at remint time.
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Then the veriﬁcation of the fairness of a remint set is diﬃcult, given that
the veriﬁer has no information about the state of the network at remint
time. An adversary could try to unfairly construct a remint set with only
nodes that are under his control, by claiming that all other (fair) users
were oﬀ-line at remint time. We are going to prevent this kind of attack
by taking the density of the set R as an indicator for the authenticity of
the coin. We deﬁne the density as
d(Rk) = max
i∈Rk
|i− h(id(k))| .
Let us assume that the density of the overlay network does not change
very fast. Meaning that it is very unlikely, in a worldwide network with
a large amount of users, to have big ﬂuctuations in the amount of users
connected to it, in short periods of time. Let α be the maximal rate of
change for the density of the overlay network, i.e. if T is the maximal
time to live for a coin, and d(t) is the density at time t, then for all t′
between t and t + T , we have 1αd(t) ≤ d(t
′) ≤ αd(t).
We call a remint set acceptable (for a coin) if it satisﬁes our constraints
on the remint set, and does not contain members beyond the boundaries
speciﬁed by the density. In such a scenario, an adversary does not have
much freedom while selecting the users in R without drastically increasing
d(r).
Another issue that needs to be addressed in a dynamic network is the
history transfer between users. The neighbourhood Rk for a coin k should
keep as an invariant the history of any reminted coin within the period
[ts(k), ts(k)+T ]. Given that the history consists of signed coins, it is not
possible for an adversary to forge it. Therefore, a joining user can just
renew its history by querying its neighbours for it.
checkBase(u, k):
if isReminted(k) then
. {k′, newts,R′, CR, u
′}R := k
. return u′ = u ∧ R′ = R
. ∧newts ∈ [now()− T, now()]
. ∧ d(R) ≤ α d(now())
. ∧ validSig(k,R,CR)
else
. 〈x, y〉 := k
. u′||sn||ts := x
. return h1(x) = h2(y)
. ∧u′ = u ∧ ts ∈ [now()− T, now()]
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The only modiﬁcation that remains, with respect to the static version,
is the function checkBase, which now veriﬁes the density of the remint
set, instead of the equality with the neighbourhood.
Security Analysis. We analyse security of the dynamic protocol similar
to the static case.
Proposition 1 (Hoeﬀding bound). For a hyper-geometrically distri-
buted random variable X, representing the number of successes among n
draws, with probability p of success we have [14,7]
P (X ≥ np + g) ≤ e−2g
2/n
Lemma 3. Let p = t−cn−c , ﬁx β such that c ≤ βr, and suppose β+α
2p < 1.
If r ∈ O
(
α2s
(1−β−pα2)2
)
, then any acceptable remint set contains at least
one honest node with probability 1− 2−s.
Proof. The remint set is ﬁxed at remint time t. The adversary needs to
pick r nodes for the remint set such that it does not violate the accepta-
bility condition d(R) ≤ αd(t′), which is checked the next time the coin is
reminted at time t′ ≤ t + T . At t′, the density d(t′) ≤ αd(t) This means
that at time t it can, at best, select r nodes from the ﬁrst α2r nodes from
the root of the coin and then take control over c of them. It is successful
if among these α2r nodes there are r − c faulty ones.
Let X be a random variable representing the number of faulty nodes
in such a sample of α2r nodes from all n nodes (t− c of which are faulty).
Then the adversary is successful if X ≥ r− c. X is distributed according
to the hyper-geometric distribution, with p = t−cn−c , and we are interested
in bounding
P (X ≥ r − c) ≤P (X ≥ r − βr) {β + α2p < 1}
=P (X ≥ pα2r + (r − βr − pα2r)) {Hoeﬀding bound}
≤ e−2(r−βr−pα
2r)2/α2r = e−2r(1−β−pα
2)2/α2
which we want to be less than 2−s. Then, by taking logarithms
log2 e(−2r(1− β − pα
2)2/α2) < −s
and hence
r ≥
α2s
2(1− β − pα2)2 log2 e
which completes the proof. unionsq
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Lemma 4. In every remint set, fair nodes can always transmit their re-
mint history to another fair node before leaving.
Proof. As a corollary of Lemma 3 and given the assumption that node
joins and leaves are atomic operations, at least two fair nodes must be
in a valid remint set, whenever a fair node is going to leave it. This fact,
together with the secure routing assumption over the overlay network,
implies that fair users can always transmit their remint history to another
fair node before leaving.
Theorem 2. Whenever a coin is double-spent, that coin expires or one
corrupted node is identiﬁed. (the proof in Theorem 1 also applies here)
5 Early Double-spending Detection
In some scenarios double-spending detection might not be good enough.
This is the case when an adversary is able to add new corrupted nodes
easily. It is possible for a corrupted user who owns a karma coin, to spend
it many times and very quickly, especially when the coin is just minted
(or reminted). Although those actions are eventually going to be detected,
this is not going to happen until the ﬁrst two remint-request of this coin
are submitted. This user of course is going to be punished, but then the
adversary might get another Id and repeat this operation. To counteract
this kind of attacks, besides making it harder for an adversary to get
new ids, it is possible to detect double-spending early. As a ﬁrst line of
defence, when a user receives a new coin, he performs a search over the
coins he possess looking for duplicated identiﬁers. In case he succeeds,
the double-spender is immediately blacklisted. The probability of ﬁnding
a duplicated coin just like that is small, especially when the number of
copies is not too big. To improve this, we introduce coin attractors to
the system. An attractor is a user, whose hashed id is the closest to the
hashed id of the coin. Then, when a user s wants to spend a coin at the
merchant m, s searches over his coins for the one which has the minimum
distance with the merchant’s hashed id,
kd = min
k∈Ks
|h(m)− h(id(k))| ,
and pays with it. Even thought faulty nodes may avoid sending coin to
attractors, eventually a good node will do so. At that point the attractor
will detect the double spending.
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6 Conclusions
We have presented a completely decentralised, oﬀ-line karma implement-
ation for P2P and grid systems, that detects double-spending and other
types of fraud under varying adversarial scenarios. This is, so far, the
ﬁrst system for truly oﬀ-line karma coins, which can be used in highly
dynamic peer-to-peer networks and grid systems. Our system outperforms
previously proposed system of similar characteristics, under certain scen-
arios. In particular, we are able to completely replace a central bank by a
distributed remint set whose size is roughly proportional to the security
parameter s.
Several interesting research questions remain. For instance, the length
of a coin increases with every transaction, and involves several public-
key cryptographic operations. This is quite heavyweight, in contrast with
micropayment schemes that are usually associated with the kinds of value
transfers we consider here. One open area of research is to investigate the
use of micropayment techniques in oﬀ-line scenarios like karma. Another
question is whether the use of trusted computing enabled nodes allows
for more eﬃcient implementations of karma.
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